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TRUTH AND LEGITIMACY IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCESS
CHRISTOPHER A. BRACEY'
William Pizzi, TRLIAis WIHOUT TRUTH (New York University

Press, 1999) 254 pp.
Modem constitutional criminal procedure-specifically,
the elaborate regime of rights and procedural safeguards for
criminal suspects and defendants-has received a great deal of
attention and scrutiny over the past decade. A new perspective
on the criminal process, premised on the belief that the social
and political conditions that necessitated liberal reform of the
criminal process no longer exist, or that the normative structure
that protects these reformist measures from erosion has been
drained of its vitality, is quickly gaining currency in both the
theoretical halls of academe and the pragmatic realm of municipal governments. This new perspective threatens to render
serious talk about the need to protect the rights of the accused
politically and culturally passe. If the reforms of the 1960s and
1970s constituted a revolution in criminal procedure, the current climate reflects a powerful and sustained counterinsurgency.
The touchstone of this new perspective is an abiding belief
that "[t]he days of needing close judicial supervision to guard
against use of the criminal process to discriminate against the
. Visiting Assistant Professor, Northwestern School of Law. B.S. 1992, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill;J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School.
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politically powerless are over."' The leading proponents of this
view-University of Chicago law professors Tracey Meares and
Dan Kahan-contend that close judicial scrutiny of police discretion and related aspects of the criminal process is no longer
necessary because minorities now possess sufficient political
status to protect themselves from the ill-effects of pernicious police practices.! Similarly, Harvard University law professor Randall Kennedy, in an effort to "free [himself] of reflexive
obedience to familiar signals,"0 has argued that criminal law enforcement policy that disproportionately affects AfricanAmerican suspects and defendants may be justified as a "public
good" from the perspective of law-abiding African-Americans,
who are statistically more often victims of crimes committed by
African-Americans. 4 Other scholars have offered similar critiques of the modern criminal process that build on this immediate theme. 5
The message sent by proponents of this new perspective is
unmistakably clear: the criminal process in its present for, and
especially the regime of procedural safeguards intended to protect the interests of minority and indigent defendants, is tragically out-moded-a procedural relic reflective of and tailored to
social circumstances of a by-gone era. The legal doctrines underlying the "modem" regime that once served a noble purpose
have simply outlived their usefulness. The image of the criminal process advanced is that of a regime rendered anachronistic
by the passage of time-one that is now failing us.
William Pizzi's Trials Without Truth provides an interesting
variation on this increasingly familiar theme. A comparative
criminal proceduralist by trade, Professor Pizzi demonstrates
the extent to which our criminal process purportedly fails us by
'David Cole, Discretion andDiscriminationReconsidered:A Response to the New Criminal
JusticeScholarship,87 GEO. LJ. 1059, 1061 (1999).
' Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86

GEO. L.J. 1153, 1184 (1998).

- RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE CIuME AND
4 See

=iI

LAw x

(1998).

id. at 69-167; Randall Kennedy, The State, CriminalLaw, and RacialDiscrimina-

tion:A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1994).
' See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing,97 COLUM. L. REv. 551,562 (1997).
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comparing our trial system with the trial systems of other Western, industrialized countries. According to Professor Pizzi, the
American trial system is fundamentally "weak" in contrast to the
"strong" trial systems of the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and
to a lesser extent England (p. 4). Professor Pizzi asserts that the
dominant criterion of "strength" in a trial system is the ability of
the system to make reliable determinations about the "true"
guilt or innocence of any given defendant (pp. 69, 222-23). The
American trial system is fundamentally "weak," according to
Professor Pizzi, because it privileges fairness norms at the expense of "truth" (pp. 71-72). Professor Pizzi maintains that legal
institutions-primarily courts-are far too concerned about the
rights of suspects and defendants. He claims that the strong
emphasis on the rights of suspects and defendants and other
fairness considerations has resulted in the establishment and
elaboration of rules and procedural safeguards that function as
barriers to "truth" (pp. 71-72).
Professor Pizzi also argues that the truth crisis in the criminal process is further exacerbated by our stubborn adherence to
a hyper-adversarial model of adjudication (p. 118-31). According to Professor Pizzi, rules designed to promote fairness and
safeguard defendants' rights conspire with the adversarial
model of adjudication to severely undermine the truth-seeking
function of the trial process (pp. 131-33). Equally significant, in
Professor Pizzi's opinion, is the way in which such reforms have
turned the American trial system into a regime of "excess"--a
system that is zealously confrontational, overly proceduralized,
and far too concerned with "winning" and "losing" as opposed
to determining the "truth" (p. 139).
The salvation of the American trial process, according to
Professor Pizzi, lies in the placement of "truth-seeking" at the
center of the criminal process. To accomplish this, Pizzi proposes the incorporation of discrete features of Western European inquisitorial trial processes into the American trial process.
Among other things, Pizzi advocates a bestowal of greater discretion to police officers to ensure thorough and complete investigations (pp. 67-68, 222-23), and to trial judges to develop
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and manage cases (p. 222). 8 Along with the aggregation of

authority within law enforcement and courts, Professor Pizzi
recommends a corresponding relaxation of rules, procedures,
and protections enjoyed by modem criminal suspects and defendants, which in Professor Pizzi's opinion, have only served as
structural impediments to accurate and reliable determinations
of guilt (pp. 223-26).
Professor Pizzi has written for nearly a decade about the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the American trial process
vis-a-vis its Western European counterparts. Not surprisingly,.
Trials Without Truth borrows heavily from his earlier work.7 Yet,
in some of that earlier work, Professor Pizzi's praise for inquisitorial processes employed in continental legal systems was tempered by reservations about the ability to seamlessly incorporate
structural elements from those regimes into the American trial
system. Moreover, Professor Pizzi has, on occasion, defended
certain aspects of the American adversarial system-prosecutorial discretion and plea-bargaining, for example-as legitimate
within the American context.9 In this earlier work, Professor
Pizzi seemed to endorse comparative approaches to criminal
procedure primarily as an effective means of opening one's
6

Pizzi is not the only scholar to have. argued that the salvation of the American

criminal process lies in the emulation of European processes. See, e.g.,John H. Langbein, Money Talks, Clients Walk, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 17, 1995, at 32, 32, 34 (arguing that
the American criminal justice system possesses "deep structural flaws" that unduly
compromise the trial process, as compared to the "effective, fair and trouble-free
criminaljustice systems" of Western Europe). Interestingly, Langbein offered a simi-

lar recommendation with respect to reforming American civil procedure. SeeJohn H.
Langbein, The GermanAdvantage in CivilProcedure,52 U. Cm. L. REV. 823 (1985).

Examples of this earlier work include: William T. Pizzi, The American "Adversary
System"?, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 847 (1998); William T. Pizzi, Discovering Who We Are: An
English Perspective on the Simpson Tria 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1027 (1996); William T.
Pizzi, Punishmentand Procedure:A Different View of the American CriminalJusticeSystem, 13
CoNsr. CommENTAR 55 (1996); William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in
German Courtrooms:A ComparativePerspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L.
37 (1996); William T. Pizzi, Soccer, Football, and Trial Systems, 1 CoLUM. J. EuR. L 369
(1995); William T. Pizzi, UnderstandingProsecutorialDiscretion in the United States: The
Limits of ComparativeCriminalProcedureas an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325
(1993); William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure:
The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial TrialSystem on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE
J. INT'LL. 1 (1992).
'See Pizzi, UnderstandingProsecutorial
Discretion,supra note 7, at 135-54, 1373.
9See id. at 1346-51, 1355-62.
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mind to reformist possibilities, yet Professor Pizzi also appeared
to understand that problems associated with practical implementation were both real and substantial. As Professor Pizzi
himself once observed:
[A] legal system is much more than a set of procedures for determining guilt and deciding on sentences. It is tied to important cultural,
historical, and political values, making it unlikely that any reform incorporated from a system that does not share those values will be adopted
or, even if adopted, will ever accomplish what it was intended to do.'

In Trials Without Truth, Professor Pizzi's tone is far less
measured, and far more confrontational. What prompted this
shift in position? The answer is not at all clear, but one might
suspect that the acquittal of oJ. Simpson for the murders of his
ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and Marc Goldman is at least
partly responsible. As Professor Pizzi notes in the introduction
to his book, "[t]he Simpson case stunned the system out of its
complacency.... [and] showed very little of which we could be
proud" (p. 2). Professor Pizzi too must have been stunned, for
he seems to have abandoned all his fears and reservations about
mixing elements of the American and continental trial processes. Prior to the Simpson case, the American criminal trial
process was in need of tweaking to streamline the proceedings.
Following Simpson's acquittal, America has a system of "trials
without truth" that can only be salvaged by getting rid of the
great majority of procedural and structural impediments that
hinder the discovery of "truth" by the police, judges, and jurors.
This review essay examines and critiques the descriptive and
prescriptive claims regarding the trial process advanced in Professor Pizzi's book.
I. THREE PRELIMINARY CRITIQUES
Trials Without Truth proves to be a provocative work that accents interesting reformist possibilities within the criminal process. Yet the book is not without flaws. What follows is a brief
discussion of three small criticisms that I believe point to larger,
more problematic features of the book. The first of these criti'oId. at 1373.

CHRISTOPHERA. BRA CEY

[Vol. 90

cisms relates to the type of support Professor Pizzi relies upon to
drive his arguments. That Professor Pizzi uses aberrational and
sensational cases-the Simpson case, the Louise Woodward case,
and the tragicomic episode of Colin Ferguson's selfrepresentation-as the basis for making broad claims about the
overall nature of the American criminal process might cause
some readers to question from the outset the sincerity of Pizzi's
critique. Indeed, in response to an earlier work in which Pizzi
employed a similar approach, Professor Ronald Allen appropriately warned that "drawing lessons from the Simpson case about
the criminal justice system, or designing solutions to the problems of that case that are to be applied to the system as a whole
are dubious undertakings.""
Professor Allen made a second criticism of that earlier work
that applies with equal force here-namely, that Professor Pizzi
does not properly distinguish between criminal processes that
are "built," such as those developed in many Western European
countries following a civil code tradition, and those that are
"grown," such as the regimes in England, the United States, and
other common law countries. 2 The conceptual and practical
differences between these two legal orders are quite substantial,
and counsel us to be wary of introducing reform measures into
the American system that are borrowed without regard either to
context or to the possible consequences. As Professor Allen put
it, "Is]hooting magic bullets into spontaneous orders raises
doubts on both sides of the equations; both costs and benefits
are dramatically unpredictable."' 3
Likewise, one might take issue with Professor Pizzi's fetishization of a particular kind of truth in the trial process. Professor Pizzi seems to equate historical fact-that is, whether person
"X" committed a particular act proscribed by law-with a fullblown guilt determination-that is, whether person "X" should
be criminally sanctionedfor having committed the act in question.
Of course, the guilt determination is far more than a simple
" RonaldJ. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the CriminalJusticeProcess, and Magic
Bullets, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 989, 994 (1996).
'2I& at 994.
"3Id. at 999-1000.
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finding of historical fact-even in an inquisitorial regime. A
guilt determination contemplates moral condemnation for the
act as well. Defenses and mitigating factors provide "moral"
facts-tidbits of information regarding the psychology, motivation, or competency of the accused-that accent the historical
facts, and inform our decision as to whether the action or event
deserves criminal sanction. The moral dimension of criminal
adjudication is most powerfully felt in the death penalty context." In Spaziano v. 1/orida, 5 Justice Stevens remarked upon the
essential role of the jury in both administering and legitimizing
capital punishment. "If the State wishes to execute a citizen,"
Stevens wrote, "it must persuade ajury of his peers that death is
an appropriate punishment for his offense."' 6 Here, persuasion
moves beyond the assertion of brute facts as to whether the defendant committed a particular crime for which a death sentence is statutorily authorized. It necessarily contemplates a
finding of moral culpability (or deservedness). For this reason,
as Justice Stevens observed, "[t]he constitutional legitimacy of
capital punishment depends upon the extent to which the proresults which reflect the community's
cess is able to produce
17
moral sensibilities."

Professor Pizzi's privileging of historical truth also seems
oddly misdirected given that no legal system can ever determine
a defendant's guilt or innocence with absolute certainty. The
reality of criminal litigation is that evidence rarely excludes all
other possibilities. Witness testimony is necessarily limited by
the vagaries of human memory and recall. For this reason,
"truth" determinations in the criminal process contemplate far
more than mere identification of historical fact, and thus re-

'" Of course, morality arguably plays a role in criminal trials more generally. As
Judge Learned Hand stated, the institution of the jury "introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical
conventions." United States ex re. v. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.
1942).
" 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
16Id. at 490 (StevensJ, concurring in part, dissenting in part).

17id.
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quire a nuanced and far less anesthetized inquiry in order to
trigger the moral condemnation of society."
Each of these criticisms point to a deeper, more fundamental problem with the book-namely, Professor Pizzi's failure to
pay close attention to certain critical features of the American
criminal process that sharply limit the usefulness of making
cross-national comparisons. More specifically, Professor Pizzi
does not take seriously the powerful ideological and cultural
underpinnings that gave rise to and continue to sustain the existing procedural regime in the face of opposition. He seems to
have forgotten or chosen to ignore a critical feature of modem
criminal procedure-that the criminal procedural revolution
was part and parcel of a much larger liberal reformist agenda
designed to counter claims of American moral and systemic illegitimacy. The transformation of the criminal process, like
many other aspects of the American society at that time, was
precipitated by the repeated and unapologetic exposure of
American society and legal institutions as betrayers of democratic principle. In the criminal context, it became clear that
the criminal process prior to modem reform efforts placed little
value on "truth," especially when indigent and minority suspects
and defendants were involved. Indeed, law enforcement played
a critical role in sustaining that failure of process. Equally important was the role of courts and legislatures in compromising
principle in the name of racial oppression to ensure the longevity of the biased regime. The criminal process revolution, then,
was the expression of a profound desire to return truth and
democratic principle to America's legal institutions-a deliberate
(albeit limited) effort to attain moral redemption and regain institutional legitimacy.

" Indeed, we value lay participation in guilt determination precisely because we
understand this moral dimension of the trial process, and seek to have community
notions ofjustice to temper the literal application of legal norms to facts. For a discussion of the moral dimensions of jury participation in the criminal process, see
generallyJEEABAMSON, WE, T-EJURY (1994) (examining the role of the jury as
providers of "common sense" to the trial system) and Steven L Friedland, The Competenu" and Responsibility ofJurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 192 (1990)
(conceptualizing the jury inter aliaas a representative body that should "convey the
moral condemnation of the community in a criminal case").
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The crisis of institutional legitimacy and quest for moral redemption are powerfully relevant to Professor Pizzi's concerns
about "truth" in the criminal trial process. As an initial matter,
Professor Pizzi's lack of adequate attention to context exposes
critical failings in his descriptive account of the American trial
process. In particular, by failing to consider the peculiar context that gave rise to modern reform of the American criminal
process, Professor Pizzi overestimates the truthfulness of the trial
process prior to the establishment of procedural rules and safeguards that he criticizes. At the same time, Professor Pizzi radically underestimates the extent to which Warren era reform
enhanced the accuracy and reliability of guilt determinations.
Additionally, when placed against the backdrop of this uniquely
American context, Professor Pizzi's descriptive claims regarding
procedural constraints on police investigations appear somewhat exaggerated.
Professor Pizzi's inattention to the historical and arguably
ongoing crisis of legitimacy in the American criminal process
also exposes critical defects in his reform proposal. The fundamental problem is that each of Professor Pizzi's recommendations presupposes a level of legitimacy currently not enjoyed by
the system. A number of recent, high-profile incidents involving abuses of police and prosecutorial authority, along with lingering concerns about current law enforcement and sentencing
policy, suggest that we should, at a minimum, entertain serious
questions regarding the legitimacy of the criminal process.
From the perspective of those who continue to question the legitimacy of the criminal process, Professor Pizzi's proposal runs
the serious risk of undermining "truth" insofar as he seeks to
aggregate power in the hands of legal actors and institutions
that, in many ways, still lack integrity in the eyes of the public.
Because Pizzi does not address these indicia of the ongoing crisis of legitimacy, his recommendation to abandon a great deal
of procedural protections and safeguards that provided limited
protection against such transgressions raises more questions
than it answers.
The remainder of this essay develops these arguments. Part
II describes the early- to mid-twentieth century collapse of moral
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legitimacy of American legal institutions, and the efforts undertaken by legal actors and institutions to seek moral redemption
and re-establish institutional legitimacy through liberal legal reform. In Part III, I shall situate and critique Professor Pizzi's descriptive and prescriptive claims regarding the American
criminal process within this expanded context. Part IV concludes.
II. THE COLLAPSE OF INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMmACYAND THE RISE OF
PROCEDURAL REFORM

The prevailing moral crisis of twentieth century American
society has been the ongoing struggle to reconcile fundamental
democratic and egalitarian precepts with the harshly undemocratic and inegalitarian practices carried out under the banner
of those principles. This crisis constitutes a crucial dimension
of any serious inquiry into the pitfalls and possibilities of mid- to
late-twentieth century liberal reform of the criminal process.
Indeed, the modem American criminal process and its normative underpinnings are best understood when one takes seriously the manner in which this crisis pre-figured liberal
institutional reform.
A. THE FAILURE OF PROCESS-MOORE V. DEMPSEYAND THE
SCOTTSBORO CASES

The precepts of American democracy-freedom and equality of individuals-as an historical matter have had catastrophic
meaning in the daily lives of many Americans. Idealized notions
of freedom and equality lie at the core of American national
identity, and provide the centripetal force necessary to generate
coherence in such a profoundly pluralistic society. Yet beneath
the heavy gloss of this idealized America lies a far more pernicious and vulgar reality. The mid-twentieth century exposure of
American society as a "disparate" democracy-as betrayer of its
best principles-would present a serious challenge to the legitimacy of many American institutions, and would provide a
catalyst for widespread liberal reform, including reform of the
criminalprocess.

2000)

BOOKREVIEW

Modem efforts to expose the moral illegitimacy of American legal institutions began in earnest at the dawn of the twentieth century when liberal advocates sought to highlight the
betrayal of democratic principle in the name of racial subjugation. Challenges to racially restrictive covenants,' 9 racially exclusive primary elections, 20 and segregated educational facilities 2
brought to light the extent of civil and social disempowerment
visited upon African-Americans as marginalized citizens in a
purportedly free society. This sustained effort eventually resulted in a series of landmark decisions that transformed a great
deal of the racial legal order.2
The seeds for reform of the criminal process were likewise
sown during this historic moment. A series of important criminal cases highlighted the dramatic failure of process that routinely occurred when African-American defendants were
involved, but more importantly, exposed the manner in which
racist politics had undermined the truth-seeking function of the
trial process. In Moore v. Dempsey, the Court reviewed the conviction of a group of African-American men, each of whom had
been sentenced to death.2 The men were thought to have been
"ringleaders" in the Arkansas race riot of 1919, in which a white
deputy sheriff was killed and another white person wounded. 24
Although African-Americans in Phillips County, Arkansas outnumbered white Americans three to one, the men were nevertheless indicted by an all-white grand jury, and tried before all

'9 Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917).
"0See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 46 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73,
82 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
,Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
"The most notable of these decisions were: Smith v. Allwrigh. 321 U.S. 649, 663-64
(1944), which declared an all-white Democratic primary in Texas unconstitutional;
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946), which declared state-compelled segregation in interstate public transportation unconstitutional; ShedL/e v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
20 (1948), which declared court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants unconstitutional; and Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), which declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional.
23See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923).
' See id. at 87-89.
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white juries.' The first trial lasted forty-five minutes.26 The jury
deliberated for five minutes, and returned with a verdict of
guilty of murder in the first degree, which carried with it a
mandatory death sentence.2 The remaining defendants received similar treatment, each ultimately sentenced to death.
The defendants subsequently filed writs of habeas corpus, in
which they claimed that they had been deprived of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.2
In a 7-2 decision, the Court overruled the lower court's dismissal of the writs of habeas corpus, finding that mob domination of the trial proceedings constituted reversible error.0 The
Court held that the petitioners' allegations sufficiently demonstrated that they had been deprived of their lives without due
process of law." Two years later, these men-along with sixtyseven other African-Americans who had been coerced into
pleading guilty and had2 received life sentences-were set free
by the state of Arkansas.3
In Powell v. Alabama,-" also known as the Scottsboro Boys Case,
the Supreme Court considered the conviction and capital sentence of nine black teenagers for the alleged rape of two white
girls. Justice Sutherland describes the manner in which they
were brought to trial:
Both girls and the negroes then were taken to Scottsboro, the

county seat. Word of their coming and of the alleged assault had preceded them, and they were met at Scottsboro by a large crowd. It does
not sufficiently appear that the defendants were seriously threatened
with, or that they were actually in danger of, mob violence; but it does
appear that the attitude of the community was one of great hostility.
The sheriff thought it necessary to call for the militia to assist in safe-

2 See RICHARD KLUGFR, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATIONAND BLAcKAMERICA'S SUGGLE FOR EQUAurv 113 (1976).
26

See id.

See id.
" Seei.
2

See id. at 114.
" Moore v. Dempsey, 261

U.S. 86,91-92 (1923).

"Id.
1
"See KLUGER, SIMLEJusucE, supranote 25, at 114.
"Powell v.Alabama (Scottsboro I), 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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guarding the prisoners. ChiefJustice Anderson pointed out in his opinion that every step taken from the arrest and arraignment to the sentence was accompanied by the military. Soldiers took the defendants to
Gadsden for safe-keeping, brought them back to Scottsboro for arraignment, returned them to Gadsden for safe-keeping while awaiting
trial, escorted them to Scottsboro for trial a few days later, and guarded
the court house and grounds at every stage of the proceedings. It is perfectly apparent that the proceedings, from beginning to end, took place
in an atmosphere of tense, hostile, and excited public sentiment. During the entire time, the defendants were closely confined or were under
military guard. The record does not disclose their ages, except that one
of them was nineteen; but the record clearly indicates that most, if not
all, of them were youthful, and they are constantly referred to as "the
boys." They were ignorant and illiterate. All of them were residents3 4of
or friends resided.
other states, where alone members of their families

The Court declared that in cases involving circumstances as
egregious as those present in Scottsboro, an indigent accused of
a capital crime has the right to a state-provided attorney.35
However, as the Court observed, defendants were not given a
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.3 The Court thus
concluded that the trial court's failure to make an effective appointment of counsel to aid the defendants in preparing and
presenting their defense constituted a denial of defendants'
right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and remanded the case back to the trial court. The defen
dants were subsequently retried and convicted, and three years
later, the Court reversed the second conviction.m In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the conviction on the ground
that the State of Alabama had denied defendants due process of
law on account of their race. 9
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 59-60, 73.
6Id. at 71.
"le at 71, 73.
Norris v. Alabama (Scottsboro II), 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
See id. at 599. An Alabama statute at the time was being interpreted by state authorities to exclude African-Americans consistently from participating as grand or
petit jurors in the criminal trials of other African-Americans. See id. at 590-91. The
Court held that this practice violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and denied defendants a fair trial. Id at 596. The Court reaffirmed this
holding three years later in Hale v. Kentucdy, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938) (per curiam).
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Dempsey and Scottboro are compelling cases not only because
they highlight obvious failures of process commonly endured by
early twentieth century African-Americans, but because they
remind us that things might have been a great deal worse. In
both cases, the defendants faced a very real possibility of death
at the hand of an angry, white lynch mob. In the early part of
the twentieth century, the practice of lynching was the power
offstage that subverted a great deal of civil and criminal justice.0
In Dempsey and the Scottsboro cases, law enforcement officials and
lower courts were directly involved in the subjugation of the
complaining litigants. Of course, it was not uncommon for local enforcement officials to conspire with unruly whites to facilitate the execution of lynch mob justice.4' When one situates
Demsey and the Scottsboro cases against the backdrop of prevailing
norms of justice, the image is not simply of a trial-process rendered unfair, but that of a legacy of racial subjugation absurdly
carried out on behalf of a democratic state made singular based
upon its purported commitment to equality and the rights of
individuals.42
In addition to providing a window into the nature of criminal process for minority and indigent defendants, as it existed
prior to reform, Dempsey and the Scottsboro cases point to the
'0The power of lynching lies in the sheer absurdity of violence carried out against
its victims. See, e.g., WALTERT. HOWARD, LYNCHINGS: EXTRALEGAL VIOLENcE IN FLORIDA
DURING THE 1930s at 60-61 (1995) (describing a lynching preceded by "a carnival of
sadism" that included amputation of victim's fingers and toes, burning of the victim's
torso with "[red hot irons," and cutting off the victim's genitals); NAACP, The Stoiy of
100 Lynchings, in TwmIYYEARs OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1918 at 26
(1919) (describing in graphic detail the lynching of Georgia woman: "Mary Turner
was pregnant and was hung by her feet. Gasoline was thrown on her clothing and it
was set on fire. Her body was cut open and her infant fell onto the ground with a littie cry, to be crushed to death by the heel of one of the white men present. The
mother's body was then riddled with bullets.").
41See ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, TIE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950
at 8 (1980) (remarking that "public officials... either cooperated with the mob or
sought refuge in silence and inaction").
42See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN Sourn 115
(rev.
ed. 1992) (noting that "lynchings were increasingly replaced by situations in which
the Southern legal system prostituted itself to the mob's demand"). According to historian Arthur F. Raper, such sham proceedings "retained the essence of mob murder,
shedding only its outward forms." Id. (quoting Arthur F. Raper, Race and Class Pressures 277-78 (1940) (unpublished manuscript)).
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primary means through which the system sought to redeem itself. In both cases, appellate courts were made available to the
litigants to contest the legitimacy of the lower court's ruling."
With each succeeding challenge-and the corresponding exposure of the failure of process:--the legitimacy of American institutions and the integrity of institutional actors were
increasingly called into question.4
Modem reform of the
criminal process, like most liberal reform that occurred during
this period, came about in response to sustained efforts to highlight the prevailing social crisis of moral legitimacy in American
society and legal institutions. In short, the task was to brand
American legal institutions as betrayers of principle in order to
trigger a sympathetic institutional response that would signal a
return to legitimacy.
B. MORAL REDEMPTION AND THE RECLAMATION OF
INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY

The touchstone of any democratic legal order is legitimacy.46 A legal regime must be perceived as legitimate by members of the regulated body if it is to retain any authority over
that body. Accordingly, perhaps the single greatest challenge
4For
a more comprehensive discussion of Dempsey, see RiCHARD C. CORTNER, A
MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES (1988). For a detailed account of the events surrounding the Scottsboro cases, see JAMES GOODMAN,
STORIES OF SCOrrSBORO (1994), and DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE
AMERICAN SOuTH (1969).

" The trial and acquittal of two whites charged with the lynching of Emmitt Till in
1955 presents a compelling example in this regard. For a brief but compelling discussion of this case, see RANDALF.ENNEDY, RACE, CgRIM, AND THE LAW 59-63 (1998).
Notably, in both Dempsey and the Scottsboro Cases, it was the Supreme Court that
prevented the execution of the defendants through the articulation of rules designed
to reclaim legitimacy for the criminal process.
* The legitimacy of any legal order must rest on law's claim to emerge from a
democratically reasoned and "reason-giving" process. SeeJURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACrS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEmOCRACY

409 (1996) ("A legal order is legitimate to the extent that it equally secures the cooriginal private and political autonomy of its citizens; at the same time, however, it

owes its legitimacy to the forms of communication in which alone this autonomy can
express and prove itself.").
17 This is especially true in the criminal context, where the use
of force is at its
height. "Constitutional, democratic, humane legal orders are distinguishable from
their lawless, authoritarian, and barbaric counterparts by the ways they authorize and
use the coercive force at their disposal.... Yet constitutional violence is violence
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presented by the mid-century push for liberal reform was the
structuring of a legitimizinginstitutional response that would return the privileged moral and political status that American institutions were thought to have previously enjoyed. The loss of
moral authority for American institutions-especially American
legal institutions-created a social crisis of epic proportions that
American institutions had no legitimate power to correct in the
name of principle. Indeed, one might have argued at the time
that the extended legacy of betrayal in the name of such principles rendered the principles themselves inherently suspect. In
the absence of a legitimate moral authority to speak selfconsciously about a commitment to racial equality, in the vacuum of trust generated by exposure of the lie of American democracy, American institutions sought moral redemption
through structuralchanges that would place strong limits on the
ability of majoritarian society to abuse authority and further
compromise an already morally suspect regime.
Criminal procedural reform therefore was part and parcel
of these structural reforms tailored to attain moral redemption
and re-establish institutional legitimacy. The most prominent
features of the structural reforms of the criminal process were
the various rules and procedural "safeguards" established by the
Warren Court. The institutional response to claims that police
officers routinely trampled on the rights of suspects in order to
facilitate harassment, seize evidence, or extract confessions was
the establishment of a regime of rules to guide police investigations. In order to place some limits on the unprovoked harassment of criminal suspects, the Court, in Terry v. Ohio48 created a
two-tiered approach to classify police conduct in order to bring
these "low-level" detentions within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment by requiring police to show a reasonable suspicion
in order to justify such investigatory stops.' To place limits on
the intrusiveness of police searches for evidence, the Court in
Mapp v. Ohio held that the Fourth Amendment not only
nonetheless; it crushes and kills with a steadfastness equal to a violence undisciplined
by legitimacy." AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS, Introduction to LAW's VIOLENCE 5
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).

U.S. 1 (1968).
9see id

48392
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guarded against unreasonable searches and seizures, but also
justified the exclusion of any illegally seized evidence from
criminal trials.50 With respect to the claim of coerced confessions, the Court in Mirandav. Arizona placed clear limits on the
manner in which suspects could be questioned at the police station.5 ' Additional safeguards were put in place to protect a suspect's rights at line-ups, 2 trial 5 3and on appeal.!
The Warren era reforms of the criminal process are best
understood as part of the overall struggle to regain institutional
legitimacy-to gain moral redemption in the wake of racial
shame. As one commentator wrote in 1968:
The Court's concern with criminal procedure can be understood
only in the context of the struggle for civil rights.... It is hard to conceive of a Court that would accept the challenge of guaranteeing the
rights of Negroes and other disadvantaged groups to equality before the
law and at the same time do nothing to ameliorate the invidious discrimination between rich and poor which existed in the criminal process. It would have been equally anomalous for such a Court to ignore
the clear evidence that members of disadvantaged groups generally bore
the brunt of most unlawful police activity.0

This reformist disposition would inform subsequent attempts to regulate grand and petit jury selection. For instance,
modem criminal procedure now regulates grand jury selection
in three distinct ways. First, the Equal Protection Clause forbids
discriminatory selection practices. 6 The complaining party
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

,SeeMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486,479 (1966).
52 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (defendant has right to
counsel at post-indictment line-ups).
5S See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (Fifth Amendment forbids
both comment by prosecution on defendant's refusal to testify and instructions to
jury that defendant's trial silence is evidence of guilt); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
35, 345 (1963) (providing right to counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases).
See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (indigent entitled to appointed counsel at state mandatory appeal stage); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19
(1956) (indigent defendant has right to obtain free trial transcripts in order to ensure adequate appellate review).
" A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Cout and Criminal Procedure,67 MlcH. L. REv. 249,
256 (1968).
"See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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must show that the discrimination was intentional, of course,
but intent is somewhat less difficult to prove in grand jury cases
Second, the
than in other kinds of equal protection cases.
Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination in
the selection of the grand jury foreman.58 Third, the Fifth
Amendment requires that grand juries be selected from a fair
cross-section of the community.5 9 Petit jury selection is likewise
governed by both the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section reSelection
quiremente and the Equal Protection Clause.
related violations in both the grand and petit jury context mandate automatic reversal.6 2 An important feature of these reforms
is that they have the dual-effect of ensuring fairness while simultaneously improving accuracy and reliability ofjury verdicts.
When one situates the reform of the criminal process within
the larger context of Warren Court era liberal reform-which
included not only racial reform of public educationo and social
interaction,6 but also the elaboration of protections afforded to
religious minorities,65 free speech advocates,6 and the indiSee Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection,41 STAN. L. REV. 1105,
1119-26 (1989).
IwPaocmuRE § 15.4(c), at 699See WAVNN P. LAFAVE &JERoLD H. IsRAEL, C
702 (1992).
59See id. § 15.4(d), at 702-03.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Fair cross-section violations, how6See
ever, apply only to the pool from which the jury is drawn, not to the jury itself. See
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986).
6' See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
62 SeeVasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986) (grandjury); Batson, 476 U.S
at 100 (petitjury, equal protection challenge); Duren, 439 U.S. at 370 (petit jury, fair
cross-section).
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia statute prohibiting interracial
marriages violates "the central meaning" of the Equal Protection Clause).
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (requiring government to prove
compelling interest in applying purportedly neutral government policy that compromises minority religious beliefs); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (declaring unconstitutional a state law requiring ten verses from
the Bible to be read aloud at the opening of each public school day); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (finding school prayer unconstitutional).
"See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that First Amendment shielded newspaper from a libel suit for printing falsehoods about a public official). Like many cases during the Warren years, there was a racial subtext to the
-7
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gent-as well as congressional racial reform,6 one gains a
fuller appreciation of the extent to which the Court sought
moral redemption and institutional legitimacy as a means to
dispel America's profound sense of shame.6
This, of course, is not to suggest that modem criminal procedure is either unproblematic or enjoys the highly coveted
status of near-universal acceptance. One can point to a number
of issues-incidents of police brutality, alleged abuses of prosecutorial authority, and curious sentencing disparities, for example----that cause many observers of the criminal process to
question the integrity of both the system and its administrators.
Indeed, the persistence of these kinds of incidents suggests
quite strongly that the criminal process continues to suffer from
a legitimacy crisis. Warren era reform of the criminal process,
then, proves disappointingly incomplete. Nevertheless, this period of reform is an important historic moment insofar as it tells
us a great deal about the nature of the crisis of criminal procedure in American society, and focuses our attention on the underlying principles that should discipline our impulse for
systemic reform.
Sullivan case, it involved an attempt by the State of Alabama to force a newspaper that
had published pro-desegregation advertisements out of business. Thus, as Professor
Horwitz remarked, "Even those Warren Court cases that are doctrinally not about
race are almost always, in one way or another, ultimately about the agony of race relations in America." Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit ofJustice, 50
WASH. &LEEL. REv. 5, 8 (1993).
67 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966) (striking
down a poll tax of $1.50 on all Virginia residents over twenty-one as discriminating
against the indigent's right to vote); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (providing a right to counsel for the indigent at all felony trials); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (granting the right to counsel because of the equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956)
(holding that an indigent criminal defendant's direct appeal cannot be denied because of an inability to afford a transcript).
" The legislative bestowal of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights
Act can likewise be interpreted as an effort at moral redemption-an admission by
larger society that the fruits of American freedom and democracy had been deliberately and unjustifiably restricted to white Americans.
Not surprisingly, commentators increasingly suggest that the Warren Court's reform of the criminal process ought to be treated as a branch of race relations law. See
WilliamJ. Stuntz, The UneasyRelationshipBetween CriminalProcedureand CriminalJustice,
107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 & n.4 (1997).
70These and related items are discussed infra Part IlI.B.
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III. REDEMPTION, SYSTEMIC LEGITIMACY, AND THE PURsUrr OF
TRUTH IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS

The crisis of institutional legitimacy and quest for moral redemption are powerfully relevant to Professor Pizzi's concerns
about "truth" in the criminal trial process. Professor Pizzi
points to the Simpson case and others as examples of trials characterized by the subversion of truth. But if there is one lesson to
be taken from the Simpson case, it is that "truth" in the American trial system (or any democratic legal order for that matter)
depends upon the perceived legitimacy of the finder of that
"truth," the means by which "truth" is discovered, and the manner in which the system acts upon that "truth." In this sense,
questions of institutional legitimacy are inseparable from concerns about truth in the trial process. As discussed below, Professor Pizzi's failure to give adequate attention to these
legitimacy concerns exposes critical failings in both his descriptive account of the American trial process, and in his prescription for reform.
A. A CRITIQUE OF PIZZI'S DESCRIPTIVE CLAIMS

Professor Pizzi.'s failure to appreciate the extent to which
the American criminal process has suffered the taint of illegitimacy weakens his descriptive account of the trial process. As an
initial matter, Professor Pizzi's failure to consider the context
causes him to overestimate the truthfulness of the trial process
prior to the establishment of procedural rules and safeguards
that he criticizes. According to Professor Pizzi, Warren era reform measures have resulted in the erosion of truth in the
criminal process. In advocating the removal of these reform
measures, our process will become appropriately refocused and
truth will be magically restored to the trial process. Yet as
Dempsey, Scottsboro, and many other cases suggest, truth was not
always at the center of the trial process.
Consider Professor Pizzi's discussion of police investigations. For Professor Pizzi, truth is first sacrificed during the investigatory stage, where police are subject to various constraints
on their ability to search and question suspects. He argues that
the exclusionary rule, which suppresses reliable evidence un-
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constitutionally seized by police officers, sacrifices too much
"truth" while at the same time does a poor job of deterring police misconduct (p. 37). Professor Pizzi also questions the wisdom of the Miranda ruling, which places constraints on the
ability of police officers to question suspects, and suppresses incriminating statements obtained during the course of improper
questioning (pp. 62-68). He suggests that criminal defendants
should be given less protection so as to enable the police to
conduct a more "complete" investigation because a "complete"
investigation is likely to yield a more accurate and reliable outcome (pp. 67-68).
In making this recommendation, however, Professor Pizzi
fails to address the fact that the moral crisis of the criminal process resulted, in part, from the key role played by law enforcement in undermining the integrity of the criminal process.
Consider, for example, the case of Screws v. United States,7 1 as described by Justice William 0. Douglas:
This case involves a shocking and revolting episode in law enforcement. Petitioner Screws was sheriff of Baker County, Georgia. He enlisted the assistance of petitioner Jones, a policeman, and petitioner
Kelley, a special deputy, in arresting Robert Hall, a citizen of the United
States and of Georgia. The arrest was made late at night at Hall's home
on a warrant charging Hall with theft of a tire. Hall, a young negro
about thirty years of age, was handcuffed and taken by car to the court
house. As Hall alighted from the car at the court-house square, the
three petitioners began beating him with their fists and with a solid-bar
blackjack about eight inches long and weighing two pounds. They
claimed Hall had reached for a gun and had used insulting language as
he alighted from the car. But after Hall, still handcuffed, had been
knocked to the ground they continued to beat him from fifteen to thirty
minutes until he was unconscious. Hall was then dragged feet first
through the court-house yard into the jail and thrown upon the floor dying. An ambulance was called and Hall was removed to a hospital where
he died within the hour and without regaining consciousness. There
was evidence that Screws held a grudge against Hall and had threatened
to "get" him.72

7'325 U.S. 91 (1945).
7
Id. at 92-93.
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The record makes clear that pursuit of the "truth" played little
part in this "investigation."
Professor Pizzi suggests that alleviating existing constraints
on the ability of police to investigate as they please will move us
closer to "truth." What he fails to acknowledge is that it was the
abuse of authority and absence of integrity in the investigatory
process that led to the imposition of procedural constraints in
thefirst instance. In this sense, Professor Pizzi's account reflects a
false nostalgia for a truth-centered regime that never existed.
In addition to overestimating the truthfulness of trial process
prior to modem reform, Professor Pizzi radically underestimates
the extent to which Warren era reform enhanced the accuracy
and reliability of guilt determinations. A great deal of the modem criminal procedural regime that Professor Pizzi claims undermines truth actually enhances the truth-seeking function of
trials while simultaneously accenting the fairness of the criminal
process. Indeed, one might argue that much of modem constitutional criminal procedure promotes accuracy and reliabilityat least to the extent that it encourages police, courts, and lawyers to conduct themselves in a responsible way. However, certain bodies of law goveming the use of suspect line-ups, 7
discovery process, 74 grand jury selection, 75 and petit jury selection 76 are accuracy-enhancing in the specific sense of producing
a more reliable outcome in a particular case. Yet even in the
two main aspects of the criminal process that Professor Pizzi
claims serve as powerful obstacles to truth-the procedural constraints on police investigations, and the right to and role of
counsel in the trial process-it is not entirely clear that truth has
been sacrificed to the extent he suggests. In this sense, Professor Pizzi's one-dimensional analysis--one dimensional in the
See, e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (holding that due process
mandates exclusion of out-of-court identification based on unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedure).
' See; e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that prosecutor has duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendant at trial). Two subsequent cases-United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S 97 (1976) and United States v. Bagtey, 473 U.S 667 (1985)-have
helped to clarify the scope and contour of the prosecutor's duty.
7'See supranotes 56-62 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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sense that any given aspect of the regime either promotes truth,
or promotes fairness, but never both at the same time-proves
descriptively false.
For instance, Professor Pizzi tends to exaggerate the extent
to which modem criminal procedure restricts police investigations. As professor David Cole has pointed out, "since the shortlived Warren Court era the Supreme Court has consistently watered down constitutional restrictions on police activity, leaving
wide areas of police conduct virtually unregulated."7 Most notably, in United States v. Whren,7 the Supreme Court held that
police may rely upon a traffic code violation as a pretext to stop
and detain a suspect for other reasons.7 As the Court noted, "a
traffic-violation arrest (of the sort here) would not be rendered
invalid by the fact that it was 'a mere pretext for a narcotics
search."'" The Court further held that, in the course of this
stop, a police officer may choose to search the vehicle without
first informing the detainee of their right to leave."' This ruling
is consistent with the Court's ruling in Ohio v. Robinette, in which
the Court remarked that "so too would it be unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are
free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary.9,82 In the "stop and frisk" context, the police officers' discretion is regulated in the mildest sense-police officers need
only find "reasonable suspicion" in order to detain an individual.8 ' And, of course, there still remain areas in which police investigations are completely unregulated because the Court has
declined to find a reasonable expectation of privacy protected
by the Fourth Amendment. For example, in California v.
Greenwood, the Court held that police officers could freely
77 David Cole, Discretion and DiscriminationReconsidered: A Response to the New Criminaljustice Scholarship,87 GEo. LJ.1059, 1071 & n.70 (1999).
7"517 U.S. 806 (1996).
7Id
at 811, 829.
oId. at 812-13 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973)).

std

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Cf Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991) (finding that suspect consented to search where officers stood over passenger,
brandishing firearms, and requested permission to search passenger's luggage).
"SeeTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
2
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search through suspected drug defendant's garbage bags because the suspects did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in garbage bags placed
outside their home.84 Police officers have exercised and continue to exercise a great deal of latitude in performing their investigatory functions-evidenced most recently in the Supreme
Court's decision in Illinois v. Wardlow--and as David Cole
points out, "the Court has consistently acknowledged the need
to defer to police officer's experience and to ensure that they
have the flexibility to react effectively to fluid situations."8
Similarly, Professor Pizzi tends to exaggerate the extent to
which the exclusionary rule undermines truth-seeking in the
trial process. A point that seems lost on Pizzi is that the exclusion of evidence that points toward a suspect's guilt is not necessarily sacrificial of truth. For example, in Stovall v. Denno, the
Supreme Court stated in dicta that due process mandates exclusion of out-of-court identification based on unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures.87 Although the court
acknowledged that such a rule seeks to prevent unfairness-that
"[a] conviction which rests on a mistaken identification is a
gross miscarriage ofjustice"e--it is obvious that this notion also
furthers the truth-seeking function of the criminal process.
Suggestive identification procedures raise questions about the
accuracy and reliability of the identification testimony, and may
not be counted upon to support an accurate assessment of guilt.
A similar rationale provides the normative basis of the exclusionary rule-that the failure of police officers to abide by a particular set of procedures renders that evidence or confession
fundamentally unreliable.
Although it is true that procedural constraints on the ability
of police officers to investigate and extract confessions enhance
the overall accuracy and reliability in the criminal process, Pro"See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988).
120 S. Ct. 673 (2000). In Wardlow, the Supreme Court upheld the stop and frisk
of a person where the only cause for suspicion was the person's "headlong flight"
from police officers in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Id.at 676.
Cole, supranote 1, at 1072 & n.78.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
Id. at 297.
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fessor Pizzi correctly observes that such constraints may pose a
barrier to truth in certain, individual cases (p. 67). But one
might interpret these as transaction costs incurred to obtain
moral legitimacy-the "price of the ticket," so to speak, for
bringing the regime in line with the best of American democratic principles. Professor Pizzi's position undoubtedly would
be that this "price" is simply too great to bear. But he cannot
make this claim in good faith aconteitually. He must speak to
the legitimacy concerns to which the regime responded. He
must argue either that the goals that procedural reform were intended to meet-the moral redemption of the criminal process
and demonstration of fidelity to the best of America's democratic principles-are no longer relevant, or that the reform
measures, in today's context, no longer serve those goals. Professor Pizzi does neither.
Rather, Professor Pizzi simply asserts that such exclusions
are bad per se, at least to the extent that they subvert the discovery of "truth." In addition, he points to the practice of "testilying"-where officers choose to lie under oath regarding
purported compliance with rules and procedural safeguards in
lieu of actually abiding by such procedures-as a practice that
not only undermines truth, but one that is a natural byproduct
of a regime that places too much emphasis on procedural rules
(pp. 66-67). Again, Professor Pizzi's acontextual approach prohibits him from seeing the obvious-that testilying is simply a
modem iteration of the crisis of legitimacy that gave rise to procedural reform in the first place. If existing constraints are insufficient to preserve the integrity of police investigations, it
cannot be, as Pizzi argues, that removal of all such safeguards
will render the investigations more reliable and accurate. If the
moral crisis is so ingrained that the officers choose to compromise their personal and official integrity when questioned about
the validity of any given investigation, we should draw little comfort from a proposal that permits such investigations to go unquestioned.
39For interesting discussions of this practice, see Morgan CloudJudges, "Testilying,
and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL L. REv. 1341 (1996) and Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Peturyand What to Do About I 67 U CoLO.L REV. 1037 (1996).
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Professor Pizzi also contends that the expanded role of defense counsel has further compromised the truth-seeking function of the trial process. For example, Professor Pizzi argues
that structural changes have interposed counsel during the investigatory phase, and thereby created an additional barrier to
the "truth" (pp. 52, 124-36). What Professor Pizzi fails to recognize is that Mirandarepresents a systemic acknowledgement that
police station confessions were presumptively illegitimate-that
the legacy of coerced and falsified confessions relied upon in
the administration of criminal justice rendered existing police
practices suspect. Absent some procedural safeguard, then,
there was no reason to believe that such statements were truthful and accurate.
Interestingly, Professor Pizzi does not claim that presence of
counsel at other phases of the criminal process functions as a
barrier to truth, though this is certainly one obvious implication
of his argument. As cases from Scottsboro to Gideon v. Wainrigh
to Coleman v. Alabamad make plain, the presence of defense
counsel is indispensable to the accurate and reliable determinations of guilt. Rather, Professor Pizzi argues that the modem
emphasis on procedural rather than substantive errors has rendered the trial process far too adversarial. Counsel become fixated on winning and losing, which leads to overzealous
litigation of collateral matters at the expense of accurate and reliable outcomes.
Here, Professor Pizzi has it absolutely correct. Relying on
William Stuntz's observation that more procedure "encourages
defense lawyers and courts to shift energy and attention away
from the merits and toward procedure,"92 Professor Pizzi highlights.the risks that excessive procedure poses to accurate and
reliable determinations (p. 193). But as Stuntz notes, the
tradeoff of merits-based claims in favor of procedural ones is
caused mainly by the lack of resources allocated toward criminal
®372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing right to counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases).
9' 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (holding that the preliminary hearing constitutes a "critical stage" to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches).
supra note 69, at 44.
9Stuntz,
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defense. The regulatory regime is "incomplete" because it provides lawyers with claims and arguments that would not otherwise exist, but fails to provide appointed counsel with adequate
resources to pursue all relevant claims. The implication of
Stuntz's observation is that the acquisition of additional funding
from the legislature would go a long way to eliminating the trading off of such claims, and thereby enable zealous advocacy that
does not sacrifice truth-a point Professor Pizzi reluctantly concedes (p. 194).
Finally, Professor Pizzi's failure to consider context causes
him to ignore the critical role of human agency in the administration of criminal justice. He tends to blame "the system" for
the erosion of truth when the better target might be the legal
actors within the regime. Professor Pizzi seems to have forgotten that the day-to-day impact of Warren Court era criminal reform is heavily dependent on lower court interpretation and
application of the various rules, safeguards, and doctrines. The
Court plainly did not possess the capacity to allocate resources,
nor could it make all the structural changes needed to provide
93 Ultifor fair and reliable guilt determinations in all cases.
mately, the Court was dependent on the states' willingness to finance, fashion, and administer significant structural reform of
the trial system. Lower courts quickly became primary judicial
regulators of police conduct and, as such, could either dilute or
expand the procedural safeguards. Thus, as Professor Peter
9' In at least two of its landmark opinions-Mirand4, and United States v. Wade-the
Warren Court explicitly sought legislative assistance in regulating police. "In Miranda,
for example, the Court stated that the specified procedures would be required 'unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it.'" Welsh S. White, Improving ConstitutionalCiminal Procedure, 93 MicH. L. REv. 1667, 1683-84 (1995) (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
Similarly, in United States v. Wad4 the Court emphasized that "[l]egislative or other
regulations ... eiminat[ing] the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup
proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial" could displace the
constitutional requirement imposed by the Court. ... In both cases, Congress failed to
provide a meaningful response.
Id. (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967)).
As Professor Amsterdam observed, a Fourth Amendment ruling by the Supreme
Court "filters down to the level of flesh and blood suspects only through the refracting layers of lower courts, trial judges, magistrates and police officials" and "in few
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Arenella observed, to a large extent, "judicial implementation of
the Warren Court's due process norms rested on the lower
courts' sympathy or hostility to the values served by the Court's
doctrine."9
That the efficacy of Warren Court era procedural reform
was dependent upon voluntary compliance should not be overlooked. Professor Pizzi asserts that there is a dramatic failure of
process in the American trial system, and places that blame
squarely on the procedural mechanisms that he claims serves as
barriers to truth. But it is not entirely clear whether the root
cause of the failure is due to actors within the regime, or the
structure of the regime itself. One might justifiably criticize the
regime as poorly thought out or incomplete in terms of its
ability to adequately regulate conduct by legal actors. But to
simply assert a failure of process, without making an effort to
identify its root causes, ultimately fails to persuade.

other areas of law are the filters as opaque as in the area of suspects' rights." Anthony
G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in CriminalCases, 45 N.Y.U.
L. Rxv. 785, 792 (1970).
9-Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functionsof CriminalProcedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L. J. 185, 191 (1983). More often than not,
hostility towards suspects and defendants reigned supreme:
To a mind-staggering extent ... the entire system of criminal justice below the level
of the Supreme Court of the United States is solidly massed against the criminal suspect.
Only a few appellate judges can throw off the fetters of their middle-class backgrounds...
and identify with the criminal suspect instead of with the policeman or with the putative
victim of the suspect's theft, mugging, rape or murder. Trial judges still more, and magistrates beyond belief, are functionally and psychologically allied with the police, their coworkers in the unending and scarifying work of bringing criminals to book.
These trial judges and magistrates are the human beings that must find the "facts"
when cases involving suspects' rights go into court .... Their factual findings resolve the
inevitable conflict between the testimony of the police and the testimony of the suspectusually a down-and-outer or a bad type, and often a man with a record. The result is about
what one would expect.
Amsterdam, supranote 94, at 792.
"See Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Questfor PenalJustice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 523 (1975) (commenting that "[o]ne devising
institutions for Utopia would not likely delegate so large a responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice process to the courts").
' See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 69, at 21 (arguing inter alia that criminal procedure's
regulatory regime is incomplete).
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B. A CRIQUE OF PIZZI'S PRESCRIPIMVE CLAIMS

Professor Pizzi offers a variety of reform measures to promote the truth-seeking function of the trial process. As an initial matter, he argues that the nature of police investigation
must be fundamentally transformed so that police can carry out
thorough and complete investigations in a non-adversarial
manner (pp. 62-67). To that end, he suggests that officers
should be encouraged to view their role as independent from
the prosecution of the case, although he fails to explain precisely how this is to occur (pp. 222-23). A second set of proposals appears to be aimed at strengthening the role of the trial
judge. Professor Pizzi advocates granting the trial judges more
authority to control the trial process, and to develop cases substantively (p. 222). With the increase injudicial authority, Professor Pizzi offers a corresponding reduction in the role of
laypersons (i.e., jurors) in the trial process (pp. 224-25). Specifically, he argues that all-layperson juries should be used only
in the less serious cases, whereas the more serious cases should
be tried before mixed panels ofjudges and jurors (pp. 224, 22628). Finally, Professor Pizzi suggests that trial procedures and
evidentiary rules should be relaxed so that legal actors can pursue the "truth" more freely (p. 224).
Each of Professor Pizzi's reform measures is perhaps meritorious in the abstract, but proves immensely problematic when
viewed against the backdrop of the moral crisis of legitimacy
within the criminal justice system. The dominant feature of
Professor Pizzi's reform measures is the aggregation of power
within legal actors and institutions to enable more "complete"
investigations and more accurate guilt determinations. But for
Professor Pizzi's reform to work, the American people must be
convinced that these legal actors and institutions will not betray
their trust. In this sense, his reform presupposes (and depends
upon) substantial trust by members of the community that legal
institutions will render "truthful" determinations. Problems
arise, however, because it is not at all clear that such trust actually exists. Furthermore, recent incidents of police brutality, racial profiling, and the abuse of prosecutorial discretion suggest
that betrayal and illegitimacy continue to plague the criminal
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justice system. In light of ongoing concerns about legitimacy of
the criminal process, it is not entirely clear that Professor Pizzi's
reform proposals would promote "truth." One might argue that
such proposals are equally likely to promote abuses, which
would exacerbate rather than improve perceptions of the
criminal trial process as illegitimate and inconsistent with
democratic principle.
The ongoing crisis of legitimacy in the criminal process is
sustained in large part by a perception that something must be
amiss within a criminal process that, despite its purportedly
strong orientation towards fairness and equality, proves so disproportionately harmful to minority and indigent defendants.
In No EqualJustice,Professor David Cole combines statistics from
a variety of sources that highlight the disparity in punishment
received by African American offenders vis4-vis their white
counterparts. 98 Perhaps most startling is his collection of data
on the enforcement of drug laws. Under current federal law, a
person charged with a crack-related offense faces a sentence 100
times harsher than a person charged with a similar crime involving powder cocaine.9 In 1992, an estimated 65% of all crack
users were white.10° However, in that same year, 92.6% of those
convicted for federal crimes involving crack cocaine were African-American-only 4.7% were white.' O' Cole also highlights a
1992 survey by the United States Sentencing Commission, which
found that, in seventeen states, not a single white person had
Cole also
been prosecuted on federal crack cocaine charges.'
draws attention to disparities in punishment meted out under
state laws that provide for the imposition of life sentence upon
conviction of a second or third felony offense. A Georgia sentencing law provides that a defendant convicted of a second
drug offense may, at the request of the district attorney, receive
See DAVID COLE, No EQUALJUSTCE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMECAN CRIMNAL
JuSTicE SYSTEM 132-53 (1999).

"As Cole points out, "a small-time crack 'retailer' caught selling 5 grams of crack
receives the same prison sentence as a large-scale powder cocaine dealer convicted of
distributing 500 grams of powder cocaine." Id. at 142.
100
Id.
101See id.

102
See i&
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a sentence of lifetime incarceration. °3 According to Cole, in
1995, 98.4% of those persons serving life sentences under the
provision were African-American.' T Similarly, African-Americans
are sentenced under California's three-strikes law at a rate 13.3
times that for whites.'05
One might be inclined to question the legitimacy of the
process based upon these statistics alone. Yet when considered
in conjunction with the prevalence of police brutality, the predominance of racial profiling, and the protections afforded to
prosecutorial discretion, there is ample evidence to lead people
to question the legitimacy of the trial process.
The persistence of police brutality powerfully undermines
feelings of trust in law enforcement agencies and reinforces
core perceptions of law enforcement as an essential component
of racial oppression. Professor Pizzi proposes that we relax restraints on the ability of the police to investigate crimes in the
field, but recent events suggest that additional constrains are in
order. For example, in June 1999, in two separate incidents,
Chicago Police officers fatally shot two unarmed AfricanAmerican motorists.' 6 Four months earlier, New York police officers fired forty-one rounds in the fatal shooting of Amadou
Diallo, an unarmed suspect, as he stood in the doorway of his
home.0 7 The Diallo shooting resulted in severe popular backlash against New York police practices.' 8 The initial insensitivity
10 Id. at 143

104 See id.
5 See id. at 148.
'06Todd Lighty & Gary Marx, Questions,Protest Clouds Cop Shootings, Cn. TRM.,June
8, 1999, at B1.
107 On February 4, 1999, four white New York City police officers, members of a
Bronx street crimes unit, shot and killed Amadou Diallo, a 22-year-old unarmed West
African immigrant street peddler, who had no criminal record, in a "ferocious barrage" of 41 bullets in the vestibule of his apartment building in the Bronx borough of
New York City. Robert D. McFadden & Kit R. Roane, U.S. ExaminingKilMng of Man in
Police Volley, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at Al. Diallo suffered 19 gunshot wounds. See
id.
'08See, e.g., Dan Barry & Majorie Connelly, Poll in New York Finds Many Think Police
Are Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al (reporting on poll results in wake of Diallo
killing, showing widespread concern about racial discrimination in policing); Jodi
Wilgoren & Ginger Thompson, Ajfer Shooting, an Eroding Trust in the Police, N.Y. TIM.S,
Feb. 19, 1999, at Al (reporting on widespread resentment of young minority New
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expressed by New York public officials only fueled further resentment.'1 9 Not surprisingly, the ultimate acquittal of the officers for the Diallo shooting was perceived by many observers as
injustice heaped upon injustice."'
The current crisis of corruption in law enforcement in Los
Angeles, California further undermines public confidence in
the legitimacy of the administration of criminal justice, and
militates against further expansion of investigatory authority of
police officers. In what some commentators have described as
"the worst [police scandal] in [Los Angeles] history,""' investigators have uncovered scores of allegations of unjustified shoot-2
ings, beatings, evidence planting, false arrests, and perjury."
Rumors of widespread corruption were first substantiated by the
testimony of former LAPD officer Rafael Perez, who provided
authorities with information as part of a plea bargain to obtain a
lesser sentence on cocaine theft charges."8 In the first of many
startling revelations, ex-officer Perez admitted to shooting a
handcuffed suspect in the head, planting a rifle next to the
fallen body, and fabricating a police report that identified the
suspect as the armed agressor" 4 Nineteen year-old Javier Francisco Ovando, paralyzed by the gunshot wound, was convicted
and sentenced to twenty-three years in prison based in large
part upon Perez' perjured testimony. 5 Ovando's conviction

Yorkers regarding apparently race-based police stops in the wake of four white police
officers' shooting of Amadou Diallo).
" See Dan Barry, Giuliani Says Diallo Shooting Coverage Skewed Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1999, at B3 (quoting NewYork City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani complaining that the
public and media have overreacted to police killing of Amadou Diallo, and noting
that since Diallo's killing, there have been 60 other murders in New York that have
not received the same attention).
"oSee Robert D. McFadden, Verdict Bares Sharp Feelings on Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2000, at Al.
. Henry Weinstein & Jim Newton, T- RAMPART SCANDAL Civil ights Lawyers
Forma GatheringStormforL.A., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al.
112
Id.
"' Scott Glover & Matt Lait, 4 Officers Back Tales ofPartiesAfter Shootings, LA. TIMES,
Feb.412, 2000, at Al.
" Joseph Trevino & Anne-Marie O'Connor, Sooner or Later the Truth Will Come Out,

L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1999, atAl.
"1 See id.
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was voided and he was released from prison following Perez'
disclosure.y6
In addition to his own criminal acts, Rafael Perez revealed
to investigators that he helped cover up three additional unjustified shootings, and knew of at least five others in which his fellow officers and their supervisors tainted crime scene evidence
in order to conceal their mistakes.1 Since September 1999,
when the scandal broke, over thirty-two convictions have been
overturned because of corrupt investigations. 8 At least seventy
LAPD officers are currently under investigation for either
committing crimes or assisting other officers in their cover-up
efforts." 9 In a revealing statement, United States Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas, who is currently leading the federal investigation into the local scandal, described the corruption and civil
rights violations as "tear[ing] at the foundation of not only our
law enforcement community, but of our civil society as a
Cast against the backdrop of such rampant abuses,
whole."
one might view Pizzi's proposal to increase police discretion and
broaden investigatory authority with a substantially elevated degree of skepticism.
Professor Pizzi also recommends that we allow police to
question suspects in the absence of lawyers, but one cannot help
but question such a proposal in light of the torture of Abner
Louima at a Brooklyn police station.' Press accounts of the sta116See id,
17

Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Shooting Scenes Were Doctored, Perez Says LAPD, LA.

TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at Al. In one of these cases, Perez and fellow LAPD officers in-

tentionally delayed calling an ambulance while they planted a gun near a suspect they
had shot and agreed upon a story. The suspect, twenty-one year old Juan Saldana ultimately died from his wound. SeeWeinstein & Newton, supranote 111.
..Matt Lait, Scott Glover & Tina Daunt, Scandal Could Taint Hundreds of Convictions, LATwEs, Feb. 17,2000, atAl.
"9Id.
"' Matt Lait & Scott Glover, FBI Launches Probe Into Rampart Scanda L.A.Tum,
Feb. 24, 2000, at Al. The exposure of corruption and brutality is expected to generate scores of civil law suits, costing the city of Los Angeles hundreds of millions of dollars. See Shirley Leung, Los Angeles Looks for Ways to Pay Claims Arising From Police

Scanda Tam WALL STRErJOuRNAL, Mar. 3, 2000, at B4 (estimating liability payouts at
between $125 million and $1 billion).
"2 See David Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody,

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at B1 (stating that police officers at a Brooklyn police sta-
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tionhouse encounter were stunning: "according to Louima, he
was strip-searched at the duty sergeant's desk and then walked
to the bathroom, where he was sodomized in the anus and
mouth. 'One [police officer] said, 'You niggers have to learn to
respect police officers ... .""12 Given that such clear abuses of
discretion continue to occur under a regime that purportedly
constrains such conduct, there seems little justification to grant
additional authority to police officers.
The prevailing practice of racial profiling by law enforcement agencies likewise proves a powerful catalyst for community
skepticism regarding the legitimacy of police practices. The
lawsuit and eventual settlement of a case against the Maryland
State Troopers is instructive on this point. According to computer data collected by Maryland State Troopers, AfricanAmerican motorists, who comprised about 17% of motorists
along the Interstate 95 corridor comprised more than 70% of
the people stopped between 1995 and 1997.22 For nearly a decade, trial and appellate courts have permitted local law enforcement agencies to consider a person's race as an element of
criminal suspicion, provided that race is one of several factors
considered. 2 4 Recent efforts to broaden the authority of law en-

tionhouse had beaten and shoved the wooden handle of a toilet plunger into the rectum of a Haitian immigrant who had been arrested for disorderly conduct, obstructing governmental administration, and resisting arrest and stating that some
community leaders and minority residents [of the New York City area] have long
complained of misconduct and brutality by police officers in minority neighborhoods).
" Michael Claffey et al., Cop Nabbed in Torture Case: Sgts. GrilledAbout Assault, DAELY
NwS (N.Y.), Aug. 14, 1997, at A3.
" See Katheryn K Russell, "DrivingWhile Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral
Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717, 727 (1999); see also David A. Harris, The Stories, the
Statistics, and the Law: Why "DrivingWhile Black" Still Matte, 84 MINN. L REv. 265
(1999); David A. Harris, "DrivingWhile Black" andAll Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and PretextualTrafficStops, 87J. CRium. L & CRIMINOLOGY 544,563-566 (1997).
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (permitting race
as an element of suspicion in border patrol stops); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d
391 (8th Cir. 1992) (permitting airline security to use race as an element of criminal
suspicion for narcotics trafficking); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425 (Ariz. 1975) (authorizing use of race as an element of suspicion to justify stop of Mexican male in predominantly white, middle to upper-middle class neighborhood).
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forcement officials to use race as an element of suspicion'2s have
led one scholar to remark that "[today, police departments
across the nation . . . continue to target blacks in126a manner

reminiscent of the slave patrols of colonial America."
The prosecutor's charging decision-the decision of which
crimes and persons to charge-remains controversial in large
part because it remains highly discretionary and largely insulated from legal challenge. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,'2 the Court
prohibited selective prosecution on racial lines. The Court proclaimed:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an
evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial
of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
28
the Constitution.

Although acknowledging that this principle remains in ef-

fect, the Court's ruling in United States v. Armstron?2 makes it
'2 Modem efforts of this sort were first given tacit approval by the Supreme Court
in WMren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772-73 (1996), a decision involving a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a possible racial profiling in routine traffic stops. The
Court's holding that existing Fourth Amendment doctrine "foreclose[d] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved," see id. at 1774, was interpreted by
most to mean that traffic stops motivated by racial prejudice of the officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment provided that there are other, non-racial reasons for
making the stop. For additional discussion of the import of the Whren decision, see
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sip. Cr. REv. 271 (1998), and AngelaJ. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops,

51 U. MIAM L. Rv. 425 (1997).
Recently, in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), .the Supreme Court
struck down an anti-loitering statute that afforded police officers exceptionally broad
power to disperse any group of two or more people standing in public if the police
suspect that the group includes a gang member. As one commentator observed,
"[d]uring the three years the law was in effect, it yielded arrests of more than 40,000
citizens, most of whom were Black or Latino residents of inner-city neighborhoods."
Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of OrderMaintenancePolicng, 89J. CpiM. L AND CRIMNOLOGY 775, 775-76 (1999).

InTracey Maclin, Race and the FourthAmendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 336 (1998).
"

118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).

Id. at 373-74.
517 U.S. 456 (1996)
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nearly impossible to prove a claim of selective prosecution on
the prohibited ground of race.
In Armstrong, the defendant argued that his prosecution in
federal as opposed to state court for possession of crack cocaine
was motivated on racial grounds.ss In support of his claim, the
defendant presented evidence that African-Americans arrested
for crack cocaine possession were handed over to federal
authorities for prosecution and punishment pursuant to the
tough sentencing guidelines that now control the discretion of
district judges, while white suspects, arrested for the same offense, were directed into the more lenient state court system.' 1
The Court declared that the prosecutor enjoys a strong presumption that its charging decisions are not motivated by racial
animus, and found that Armstrong's evidence was insufficient to
rebut that presumption.'32 The Court's ruling makes clear that
selective prosecution claims, though theoretically possible to
raise, are virtually impossible to win.
Examples of prosecutorial misconduct in connection with
death penalty cases only raise further questions of the legitimacy
of the criminal justice regime. Just last year, citizens of Illinois
learned that several innocent people-most of them members
of racial minorities-had served many years on death row before the efforts of journalism students at Northwestern University uncovered evidence that led to their release. s As one
commentator observed, "[p]erhaps the most shocking dimension of this story is the alleged complicity of prosecutors in the

a'0IdL
at 458-59.
1 2 Id at 459-60.

- Id. at 465, 470.

" See Douglas Holt & Flynn McRoberts, PorterFuUy Savors 1st Taste ofFreedom;Judge
Releases Man Once Set for Execution, Cm-. TRm., Feb. 6, 1999, at Al (reporting release of
death row inmate Anthony Porter after journalism students at Northwestern University produced evidence of his factual innocence, including recantations of witness testimony that Chicago police claimed connected Porter to fatal shootings in 1982, and

a videotaped statement by Alstory Simon, implicating himself in the murders for
which Porter had been convicted, ending nearly 17 years of imprisonment, which included an execution date stayed only two days before Porter was to die); Lawrence C.
Marshall, Innocence and Death;Lessons the State Must Heed Before It Kills Again, CI. TRm.,
Feb. 11, 1999, atA29 (giving details often death row inmates in Illinois released after
determination of innocence).

20001

BOOKREVIEW

knowing use of perjured testimony and refusal to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense."M When viewed in conjunction with the Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, which held
that the imposition of the death penalty was constitutional deT
one cannot help
spite evidence of a pattern of discrimination,'3
but conclude that there is an ongoing crisis of moral legitimacy
within the prosecutorial ranks. 8
The central problem with Professor Pizzi's recommendations for reform, then, is that he presupposes a level of legitimacy currently not enjoyed by the system. To promote "truth"
within the criminal process, one must first secure a level of legitimacy for that process so that "truth" discovered by legal actors and acted upon by legal institutions is perceived as truth. In
avoiding the legitimacy question, Professor Pizzi's reform proposals seem to raise more questions than they answer-the most
difficult being, "why should we embrace reform that seeks to
aggregate authority in the hands of institutional actors whose
conduct is increasingly being called into question?" Pizzi may
have a response-some explanation as to how his proposal
meets the peculiar challenges of the American context while
simultaneously enhancing the "truth-seeking" function of the
trial process. But that response does not appear in Trials Without Truth, and in the absence of some compelling explanation,
'" Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Book Review, Removing the Blindfold From LadyJus-

tice, 88 GEO. L.J. 115, 132 & n.128 (1999) (reviewing COLE, supra note 98). Indeed,
investigative efforts into death penalty procedures in Illinois recently revealed, in the
words of Illinois Governor George Ryan, such a "shameful record of convicting innocent people and putting them on Death Row" that the Governor declared a moratorium on all executions in that state. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends
Death Peiln--IllinoisFirstState to Impose Moratorium on Executions, Cm. TRM., Jan. 31,
2000, at Al. In the wake of the Illinois moratorium, a number of other states-including New Hampshire, Nebraska, Maryland, and Indiana-have raised questions
about their own procedures for handling death penalty cases. See Stevenson Swanson,
New HampshireBill Would Repeal Death Penalty-House Passes the Measure, But Governor
Pledges to Veto It Cm. TRm., May 11, 2000, at Al.
..481 U.S. 279 (1987). Interestingly, the author of the bare majority decision, Justice Powell, later told his biographer that McCleskey was the biggest mistake in his career and that if he had to do it over again, he would rule the death penalty
unconstitutional. SeeJoHN C. JEFFRMS, JR., JusncE LE s F. POWELL, j-: A BIOGRAPHY
451 (1994).
x' For an interesting discussion of racial disparity in punishment, see generally
COLE, supranote 98.
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there seems little reason to embrace his recommendations for
reform.
IV. CONCLUSION

Trials Without Truth serves as an important reminder that all
is not well within our system of criminal justice. It attempts to
lay bare the American trial process so that we all might take a
serious look at the way criminal justice is administered in this
country. One might dispute whether improvement means refocusing the trial process by placing "truth-seeking" at the center,
and structuring our trial system accordingly. But the urgency
with which Professor Pizzi speaks should encourage us all to
look Closely at where the criminal process appears to fail us, and
contemplate ways in which it might be improved.

